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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Generalized Non-Inferential Approach to Modeling Restricted Discrete Choice for the Case
of The Spatial Random Utility
by
Elena Labzina
Master of Arts in Statistics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018
Professor Betsy Sinclair, Chair
Multinomial logistic regression model (MNL) is a powerful and easily tractable way for
measuring the probabilistic impact of input variables on individual categorical choices.
Crucially, the standard MNL assumes that all subjects of the study have the same choice sets.
In the meanwhile, especially in political science and economics, this condition is frequently
violated. Probably, the most graphical example of varying choice sets (VCS) is partially
contested elections. Furthermore, the MNL implicitly implies the Independence of the
Irregular Alternatives (IIA) assumption by requiring i.i.d errors that contrasts the MNL and
the multinomial probit (MNP) and mixed logit (MXL) models. In the case of VCS in the
MNL, the errors are correlated and IIA is clearly violated. However, neither MNP nor MXL
allows estimating particular parameters for distinct choice sets. This obstacle is critical if
the aim is to compare the selection process conditional on the choice restrictions. This text
argues that the MNL proposes the best opportunity to model categorical choice given VCS.
For that, it advances the theory of MNL adjusting this classical model for the case of VCS.
Second, the paper proposes a way to calculate and evaluate the model posing minimal data
restrictions. Finally, this research provides an example of the model’s application.
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
This paper proposes a formal non-inferential generalization of the multinomial logistic (MNL)
model for the case of the varying choice sets (VCS). This work reformulates this classical model
making it ideologically correspondent to the current renaissance of Machine Learning (ML)
making it computationally straight-forward and virtually independent of the distributional
assumptions about the data.
The major contribution of the paper is the introduction and refinement of the filter matrix
that enables neatly integrating the VCS option with the standard MNL. Another aim of this
work is to provide a comprehensive mathematical formulation of all essential elements of the
model. While most of the technicalities of a possible implementation are straightforward and
so are not given here; code for the most sophisticated step of the estimation - the Bayesian
MCMC - is provided in the Appendix. Importantly, in terms of the coefficients, the proposed
model estimates the same coefficients for the spatial individual utility as the standard MNL
capturing categorical choice estimates. Hence, the results from the VCS can be directly
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compared to those from the classical MNL. Finally, this paper can be used as a cookbook for
performing similar research.
The paper starts with the literature review presented further in this chapter. The next
chapter addresses the necessary fundamentals: the notion of choice sets, the spatial random
utility model, and the standard multinomial logistic regression. The major contribution of
the work is presented in Chapter 3. It starts with the introduction of the notion of varying
choice sets, then discusses it in the context of the independence of the irrelevant alternatives
assumption, and then refines and introduces the central contribution: the filter matrix. The
following chapter outlines the Bayesian approach to the estimation including the necessary
priors. Also, in the second half of this chapter, it is shown that from the perspective of the
problem of optimization, the proposed refinement of the MNL for VCS is equivalent to the
analytically correct but computationally challenging existing approach. This work concludes
by providing impressive results from the application of the introduced model to the British
General elections of 2010.
Literature Review
This paper mainly speaks to two strands of literature. From the perspective of the field of
Statistics, this works contributes to the research talking about the virtues of the Multinomial
Logit regression model. While there are numerous papers in this group, three of them are
especially important for this research. First, the text from McFadden (1973) who introduced
the MNL to the scientific community in the way it is still perceived today. He was a strong
proponent of this model who argued that the MNL is the best existing tool available for
understanding human choice behavior. His core arguments for the MNL are that it is easily
traceable, has clear distributional properties, and is computationally superior to another
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popular choice model, the Multinomial probit. McFadden claimed that, above all, the MNL
has excellent convergence properties and transparent estimation algorithm.
In general, the MNL is often discussed in comparison with the MNP. More than 30 years after
that fundamental piece from McFadden, Dow and Endersby (2004) provide their excellent
take on this comparison. They confirm McFadden’s result that the MNP is more prone than
the MNL to multiple estimations problems. The authors claim that, in the end, since in the
best case scenario, these two models produce equivalent results, the MNL, as more robust of
the two, is preferable. They rule out the most usual critique of the MNL, the independence
of the irrelevant alternatives property (IIA) claiming that conditional on a particular choice
setting IIA-related concerns are not relevant.
Finally, regarding its core contribution, this work in many ways is a refinement and develop-
ment of Yamamoto’s (2015) paper. He addresses a way to mitigate the effects of one of the
potential core sources of the violation of IIA: varying choice sets (VCS). Surprisingly, there is
no other work explicitly discussing the case of VCS. The likely explanation for this is that
VCS is a fundamental problem only for the MNL. Other similar models, such as MLP or the
multinomial mixed logit, MLX, do not require the IIA; hence their results do not become
biased because of VCS. Train (2002) provides a great overview of these methods, also talking
extensively about various estimation approaches.
However, Yamamoto’s ideas are critical from the perspective of the electoral studies. The
problem with MNP and MXL is that they do not allow to derive particular choice set-related
estimates. While studying the elections, it is indeed natural to be interested in explicit
comparison of the model’s estimates from electoral regions that have different sets of available
parties. In contrast to the MNP and MXL, the adjusted MNL allows to estimate the
region-specific parameters.
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Hence, logically, the second strand of literature to that this paper contributes is electoral
studies. The potential of this research is not limited to this field, however, electoral studies
provide, probably, the most graphical example where explicit accounting for VCS is essential.
Because of the method’s electoral focus, the selection of the spatial utility model as the
fundamental component of the MNL is convenient (e.g Claassen et al. 2011,Galiani, Schofield,
and Torrens 2014).
There are four papers that apply the core idea of Yamamoto’s paper to studying elections.
This main idea, an approach to adjust the MNL for VCS, is best summarized with formula
(3.1) that is later discussed in detail in the text. First, his own paper looks at the municipal
elections in Tokyo. Second, McAlister, Jeon, and Schofield (2015) use this formula for the
Canadian elections’ data. They do it without any refinement; it is still possible because
Canada provides an extremely simple electoral setting: there is just one additional party
in one region, Quebec. Finally, Labzina and Schofield (2015) and Labzina, Barceló, and
Schofield (2017) apply the method presented in this paper. Despite that Labzina and Schofield
(2015) provide a simplified overview of some contributions of this work, this text is actually a
continuation of two “non-papers” earlier performed by the author. The first version of these
ideas was presented in the term summary for the course "Bayesian Statistics" (Math 459)
in Spring 2014. Then, in the following summer, the research was presented as a poster at
Political Methodology conference 2014.
4
Chapter 2
Foundations
2.1 Choice Sets
Further in the text, choice sets refer to discrete choice sets available to decision makers. They
can be consumers, voters, parties, firms, households, families, or any other units making
decisions. Choice sets contain competing alternatives, among which the decision maker makes
a rational choice.
A choice rule is rational if it satisfies the conditions of completeness and transitivity (Mas-
Colell, Whinston, Green, et al. 1995). Completeness means that the decision maker either
prefers one of each two alternatives or is indifferent between them. Transitivity is a mathe-
matical property that states that if a is preferred to b and b is preferred to c, it implies that
a is preferred to c. To rule out cyclicity of the preferences, also called the Condorcet paradox,
transitivity is necessary to hold for each triple of the alternatives in the choice set.
5
For continuous inputs, the choice rule is usually expressed as a utility function that the
decision maker maximizes. The next section talks about the utility function employed in this
paper - the spatial utility model.
To be compatible with the discrete decision framework, the alternatives (and, hence, the choice
rule) must satisfy three properties (Train 2009). First, the alternatives must be mutually
exclusive, meaning that choosing one alternative implies rejecting other alternatives. Second,
the set of choices must be exhaustive, or that all available alternatives must be included in
it. This condition is another way to refer to the condition of completeness, which has been
already mentioned. Finally, the number of the alternatives must be finite.
Most models, including the standard MNL, assume the homogeneity of the choice sets. In
other words, it means that all decision makers in the sample can select from the same set of
alternatives such as political parties or consumer goods. The case when some alternatives are
restricted to some individuals is referred as varying choice sets (VCS). The paper talks about
VCS in the context of the MNL in detail in the following chapter.
2.2 Individual Spatial Random Utility Model (RUM)
Decision makers select alternatives based on a utility model. If the model assumes n individuals,
i ∈ I, and k alternatives, j ∈ J , then i prefers alternative s over p if Uis > Uip. Uij denotes
the actual unobserved utility. The observed, modelled, utility is called representative: Vis.
Since all aspects of Uij are never revealed: Uij 6=Vij (Train 2009).
The typical way to perceive the relation between actual and representative utility is by adding
a stochastic component: Uij = Vij + ξij, where ξij includes the factors not captured with the
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representative utility including randomness. This is a purely schematic way of showing the
relation between Uij and Vij: the actual relation can be more far more complex than linear.
Given the stochasticity, the decision maker makes the choice based on his or her evaluation
of the probability, P (Uis > Uip) = P (Vis − Vip > ξip − ξis|s 6= p). Hence, the choice rule is
dependent on the distributional assumptions about ξij . Finally, choosing the best alternative
z is based on the evaluation of
z = argmax
s
P (∩Uis > Uij|∀j ∈ J)
Further this section focuses on one spatial way to model the representative utility. Then, the
following section addresses one of the approaches to stochastically connect the continuous
utility function to the categorical choice: MNL.
This model assumes that n individuals, i ∈ I, choose one of k alternatives, j ∈ J . Each
individual has his or her preferences’ location (the bliss point): Xi (a vector of coordinates);
each alternative has its location in the same space: Zi. The degree of the content of individual
i with alternative j is based on j’s proximity to i’s bliss point and the valence of j (e.g Claassen
et al. 2011; Galiani, Schofield, and Torrens 2014):
v(xi, zj) = valence componentj + proximity between xi and zj.
In case of the varying choice sets, there is also a variation in terms of the alternatives feasible
to i denoted as m(i).
valence component - is the non-spatial component that characterizes the “non-spatial” attrac-
tiveness of alternative j given the available set m(i); further the linear decomposition of the
valence component is assumed as λj + µm(i),j
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spatial component - without restricting the generality regarding the number of the dimensions
the distance between xi and zj is further referred by the distance operator ||.|| with the
spatial factor β > 0.
If j is unfeasible for i, or j /∈ m(i), the utility is undefinable.
Summing up, for ∀i, j the spatial individual utility:
Then:
v(i, j) = v(xi, zj|m(i)) =
 λj + µm(i),j − β||xi − zj|| j ∈ m(i)∅ j /∈ m(i) (2.1)
2.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression (MNL)
MNL is, probably, the most popular approach to connect the utility of Uij to the probability
of that i selects j. If Uij = Vij + ξij and yi = j is i’s choice: the selection of j is driven by
the probability that Uij > Uik for ∀k 6= j ∈ J . McFadden et al (1973) has shown that if the
disturbances {ξi} are i.i.d with the Weibull distribution:
F (ξij) = exp(−eξij)
then
P (yi = j) =
exp(vij)∑
∀k∈J exp(vij)
(2.2)
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Importantly, in the end, this result is based on the distribution of the differences between
{ξi}’s that have the Type I or extreme distribution. This distribution is close to the normal
distribution and most researchers agree that in applications it can be assumed normal (Dow
and Endersby 2004). Hence, often the explicit assumption of MNL is that {ξi}’s are normally
i.i.d.
The main advantage of MNL is its tractability and computational feasibility. Also, as
McFadden et al (1973) states, MNL has superior convergence preferences, especially, compared
to another popular model, MNP, which is prone to have hardly detectable flat areas around
the equilibrium.
A crucial consequence (and a potential weakness) of this model’s distributional properties is
the implicit implication of the Independence of the Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition
that is going to be addressed in the following chapter (Dow and Endersby 2004).
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Chapter 3
MNL with Varying Choice Sets (VCS):
Formal Model
3.1 Why is VCS problematic?
As already said in the previous section, categorical selection models including the MNL,
assume the homogeneity of the choice sets. Formally, it means that if m(i) denotes the
alternatives available to i and J is the full choice set, then m(i) = J, ∀i ∈ J . Meanwhile, in
political science and economics, variation of m(i) is not rare. In political science, one example
of such situations is partially contested elections typical on the local municipal level, when
some parties may not run in every district (Yamamoto 2014). In Canada (Gallego et al. 2014),
the UK (Labzina and Schofield 2015), and Spain (Labzina, Barceló, and Schofield 2017), not
all parties compete in every region during the General elections. In economics, consumer
goods may be not available on all markets. Further, the paper assumes that a significant
portion of the existing alternatives is available in all possible types of distribution. Hence it
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is legitimate to assume the number of all existing distributions is not greater than the full
number of the alternatives, k.
For the further discussion, let’s stick to the linear stricture: Uij = Xijαj + ξij (in the vector
form), to which the spatial utility corresponds.
While MNP and MXL allow for the correlation of the residuals, hence formally they are
applicable, the specification of these models does not let track the differences between the
choice sets (Dow and Endersby 2004). For example, this means that they do not allow to
estimate the region-specific parameters in the setting of partially contested general elections.
Meanwhile, the MNL provides an opportunity to specify the model to reflect the properties
of particular choice sets. However, the classical formula 2.2 would lead to the violation
of the i.i.d assumption about the errors. This would happen because the residuals for the
observations such that m(i) = m(j) = M ⊂ J are correlated, reflecting the restriction imposed
by M.
As a solution to this problem, the analytic adjustment proposed by Yamamoto (2015) is to
explicitly account for the feasibility of the alternatives:
P (yi = j) =

exp(vij)∑
∀j∈m(i) exp(vik))
j ∈ m(i)
0 j /∈ m(i)
(3.1)
(3.1) fixes the feasibility mispecification implied by (2.2): now only individually feasible
alternatives are assumed to have positive probability of the selection.
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Unfortunately, introducing (3.1) is not enough to get actual estimates of the model. First,
even if formally the potential correlation between the errors is removed, we still may be
concerned about the feasibility of the normal i.i.d assumption of the errors. The following
chapter will talk about ways to mitigate these concerns by employing the Bayesian approach
to the computation.
Second, despite being theoretically precise, (3.1) is computationally problematic, since it is
unclear how to implement the summation for each m(i) during the estimation of the likelihood
function. Further in the text, the paper shows how to construct a computationally feasible
formula for the MNL with VCS. Furthermore, in the following chapter, the newly proposed
formula and (3.1) are proven to be computationally equivalent by showing that they produce
equivalent log-likelihoods
3.2 The IIA Assumption
Before proceeding to the major contribution, it is necessary to address the IIA assumption,
since it is often mentioned as one of the critical features of the MNL model. Why is the
ability to explicitly account for VCS is essential even if the interest is the estimates for the
universally available options?
To begin, the Independence of the Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA) is a fundamental
concept from the decision theory that is implicitly embedded in the MNL by the i.i.d condition
on the residuals. The idea of the IIA is that the binary choice between each two alternatives is
independent of other alternatives and their feasibility. Mathematically, according to Austen-
Smith and Banks 1999, the classical textbook about Social Choice and Decision Theory, for
a choice set, J :
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Definition A binary choice rule ϕ is IIA if for ∀ i ∈ I, ∀J ′ , J ′′ ⊂ J , and ∀j1, j2 ∈ J ′ , J ′′
ϕi(J
′
, {j1, j2}) = ϕi(J ′′ , {j1, j2})
In the case of the standard MNL, it is always the case that J ′ = J ′′ = J . Hence, despite that
it is impossible to claim that the IIA holds for all possible subsets of J, conditional on the
universal feasibility of all alternatives from J, the IIA formally holds. Substantively, this
means that if the model always deals with the full set of J, what happens with the preferences
if some alternatives are unfeasible simply lies out of the problem’s domain. Hence, the IIA
is satisfied by default. However, what happens in the MNL model with the VCS, in other
words, if ∃i for which the preferences are observed only on Ji 6= J? On the surface, this is
not a problem since the interest is in the average estimates. Since these i never selects the
alternatives outside of Ji, these unfeasible alternatives are implicitly implied to have zero
utility for i. Hence, the standard MNL, even in the presence of the VCS, must provide the
valid estimates. However, this conclusion is incorrect.
To begin with, the explicit sign that something is wrong with this approach (the standard
MNL in the case of the VCS) is the possibility to predict non-zero probabilities for individually
unfeasible alternatives lying outside Ji. This is the consequence of the violation of the IIA,
which must hold for the estimation to be correct. Without the VCS adjustment, the model
assumes that all i’s have equal conditional preferences, ϕi = ϕ. However, in case of VCS, for
various i’s the choice is observed on various subsets of J.
In formal terms, the following situation takes place. The standard MNL model assumes that
for ∀i, j: ϕi = ϕj. Let’s assume that the choice sets Ji 6= Jj such that Ji ∪ {k} = Jj. Then,
∀m ∈ Ji ϕi(m, k) = ϕj(m, k) must hold. In the meanwhile, ϕi(m, k) = ∅, or is out of the
domain of the problem, since k 6∈ Ji, and ϕj(m, k) 6= ∅ by definition since k ∈ Jj. Hence,
ϕi(m, k) 6= ϕj(m, k) and the IIA is formally violated, and assuming the IIA and Ji = Jj = J
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always produces biased estimates for the predicted probabilities. Importantly, since the
predicted probabilities are constrained (∀i : ∑∀j pij = 1), the estimates must end up biased
even for the universally feasible alternatives.
Let’s show that the adjustment proposed in the previous section and summarized with (3.1)
fixes the above-described sign of the violation of the IIA. This is true since the variations
in {ϕi} are allowed by (3.1), and, according to this formula, the probability to select an
unfeasible alternative is zero.
3.3 The Filter Matrix
The major problem with the formula (3.1) is that it is computationally challenging to account
for the inclusion of an alternative in m(i). Also, the approach proposed so far does not allow
to evaluate any common properties of the family, {m(i)}.
To fix these problems, this paper introduces the filter matrix, n>>k:
Φ({i}) =

m(1)
m(2)
...
m(n)

=

φ11 φ12 ... φ1k
φ21 φ22 ... φ2k
...
φn1 φn2 ... φnk

, φij =
 1 j ∈ m(i)0 j /∈ m(i) (3.2)
Then, the number of linearly independent columns equals the number of the types of the
choice bundles that must be the same as rank(Φ). For example, if there are k alternatives
and for some individuals alternative k is not available:
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rank

1 1 ... 1
1 1 ... 1
...
1 ... 1
1 ... 0

= rank
1 1 ... 1
1 1 ... 0
 = 2 (3.3)
Then (2.2) given (3.2) can be transformed:
P (yi = j) =
exp(u(i, j))φij∑
∀k∈J exp(u(i, k))φik
(3.4)
This matrix is denoted filter matrix because it “filters out” of unfeasible alternatives. In
particular, u(i, j) = ∅ =⇒ φij = 0 =⇒ P (i, j) = 0. Then, (3.4) applies for ∀i, j and makes
the computation straight-forward. Meanwhile, for the standard MNL, where ∀i, j φij = 1:
(3.4) = (2.2). Hence, it becomes a partial case of the proposed extension of 3.4.
3.4 Refinement of the Filter Matrix
The structure of Φ is clearly redundant and can be simplified since Φ is likely to contain a lot
of equal rows that correspond to the same choice bundles. Let’s denote the modification of Φ
that contains only distinct rows that represent different choice bundles as Φ′ . Then, trivially,
rank(Φ) = rank(Φ
′
).
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Also, let’s introduce the inversible operator M : M(Φ) 7−→ Φ′ fully described by the column-
vector M ′ ∈ Rn, that maps Φ and Φ′ :
φ
′
m′ (i),j = φi,j (3.5)
As assumed before, the number of all possible distributions is not greater than k. Then,
instead of nk distinct values this method deals at most with n+ k2 values, which decreases
the number of the input variables by at least k(n− k − 1). In context of large datasets, the
change in the volume of the stored information is approximated by limn→∞ nkn+k2 .
By L’Hospital’s Rule (Taylor 1952),
lim
n→∞
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
n→∞
f
′
(x)
g′(x)
,
which implies:
lim
n→∞
nk
n+ k2
= lim
n→∞
k
1
= k
Illustrative example
Hence, the proposed adjustment results in k times less stored information.
To provide a tentative example of how Φ can be transformed into a combination of M ′ and
Φ
′ :
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Φ =

1 1 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 1 1

=⇒ Φ′ =

1 1 1
1 0 1
0 1 1
 ,M ′ =

1
2
2
1
1
3

(3.6)
Hence, the number of the stored variables decreases from 18 to 15. However, for n =
100,000,000 and the same Φ′ the economy will be more impressive: the decrease is from
300,000,000 to 100,000,003.
What is the intuition behind Φ′ and M ′? Φ′ defines distinct types of choice sets existing
in a setting and implicitly assigns each of them an order number corresponding to the row
number where it is described. M ′ maps each observation in the sample to a distinct choice
set specified in Φ′ .
An illustrative substantive example is an electoral setting where different sets of parties run
in country regions (Labzina and Schofield 2015, Labzina, Barceló, and Schofield 2017). Φ′
has as many rows as there are the regions and M ′ just denotes the region of each individual.
Summing up this section, the generalized logistic link for ∀i, j :
P (yi = j) =
exp(u(i, j))φ
′
m
′
ij∑
∀k∈J exp(u(i, k))φ
′
m
′
ik
(3.7)
17
18
Chapter 4
Estimation of the Model
4.1 Bayesian Approach as an Non-Inferential Method
As said before, the standard MNL way to account for uncertainty may be problematic because
of likely violations of the normal i.i.d assumption in the case of VCS. As said in the very
beginning, the work proposes to use the non-inferential approach, meaning significantly
relaxing data distributional assumptions.
In the inferential approach, the error is an additive part of the latent utility function. For
example:
uij = vij + ij, j ∼ EV (0, 1) (4.1)
Meanwhile, in the Bayesian approach the additive error term is not included in the linear
input of the model. Then, how does the model account for the uncertainty?
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The general form of the utility model this paper estimates (2.1) contains 1 + (J − 1) +
(
∑
∀m(i) |m(i)| - 1) unknown parameters: θ = (β, {λj}1, {µm(i),j}2).
While in the standard inferential statistics these parameters would be considered unknown and
constant, the Bayesian philosophy assumes them random variables. The Bayesian approach
methods allow to derive the distributions of the parameters that provide the best fit for the
existing data.
Formally, the posterior distribution of the parameters, p(θ|y), is obtained based on a prior
distribution, p(θ), and the likelihood of the data conditional on the parameters, L(y|θ):
p(θ|y) ∝ p(θ)L(y|θ) (4.2)
While in some cases (relatively rare in a real setting) the posterior can be mathematically
derived, the advantage of the Bayesian approach is the existence of iterative procedures that
simulate the posterior distributions without finding the analytic solution. Bayesian Markov
Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods, as, for example, the three-step Metropolis-within-
Gibbs algorithm from Yamamoto 2014, work well even with non-informative priors. As the
canonical textbook on Bayesian statistics (Gelman et al. 2014) states, the convergence to the
proper posterior given a sufficient number of the iterations is not dependent on the priors.
The empirical independent of the final solution to the specification of the prior is the key to
why this method can be claimed as non-inferential. Despite the necessity to select the priors,
certain uninformative priors are known to provide the converge of the model.
1λ1 = 0 as in the standard MNL
2µm(1),1 = 0
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Currently multiple packages exist that compute the posterior distribution of the parameters
via MCMC. One of them, JAGS with its R library rjags, is provided as the example of
implementation in the appendix. While being flexible regarding the data, the implementation
still requires an explicit specification of the prior description of the parameters and the
likelihood function of the data given the parameters.
4.1.1 Priors
The following non-informative priors are based on Yamamoto 2014 and have been successfully
empirically tested in Labzina and Schofield 2015 and Labzina, Barceló, and Schofield 2017:
β ∼ N(0, 1/1000) (4.3)
λj ∼ N(0, τλ) , τλ ∼ Gamma(1/10, 1/10), ∀j > 0 (4.4)
µm(i),j ∼ N(0, τµ) , τµ ∼ Gamma(1/10, 1/10), j ∈ m(i) ∀m(i) (4.5)
4.2 Likelihood Function for the MNL with VCS
Let’s show that the newly proposed formula for probability (3.7) produces the same log-
likelihood as the original analytically valid formula (3.1), first proposed by Yamamoto (2015),
and so, these formulas are equivalent from the perspective of the computational optimization.
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First of all, let’s look at the log-likelihood for the standard MNL explicitly derived from the
probability function (2.2):
L0(.) =
n∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
J∑
j=0
eu(i,j))) (4.6)
Meanwhile, for the newly proposed formula for MNL with VCS (3.7), the log-likelihood is
L1(.) =
n∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
I(yi = j)(u(i, j) + log(φ
′
m
′
ij
))− log(
J∑
j=0
e
u(i,j)φ
′
m
′
i
j)) (4.7)
Formula (4.7) looks different compared to the log-likelihood for the fundamentally correct
(3.1):
L2(.) =
n∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
∑
j∈m(i)
eu(i,j))) (4.8)
Let’s prove that L1(.) is equivalent to L2(.)
Since I(yi = j) = 1 =⇒ j ∈ m(i) =⇒ log(φ′m′ij) = log(1) = 0 and I(yi = j) = 0 zeroes out
undefined in that case log(φ′
m
′
ij
). Hence, (4.7) simplifies to:
n∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
J∑
j=0
eu(i,j)φ
′
m
′
ij
)) (4.9)
Then,
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n∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
∑
j∈m(i)
e
u(i,j)φ
′
m
′
i
j +
∑
j /∈m(i)
e
u(i,j)φ
′
m
′
i
j)) =
∑n
i=1(
∑J
j=1 I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
∑
j∈m(i) e
u(i,j)(1) +
∑
j /∈m(i) e
u(i,j)(0))) =
∑n
i=1(
∑J
j=1 I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
∑
j∈m(i) e
u(i,j) +
∑
j /∈m(i) 1)) =
∑n
i=1(
∑J
j=1 I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
∑
j∈m(i) e
u(i,j)) + constant,
which is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=1
I(yi = j)u(i, j)− log(
∑
j∈m(i)
eu(i,j))) = L2(.)
Hence, it has been proven that L1(.) and L2(.) are equivalent.
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Chapter 5
Application of the Model: British
General Elections in 2010
The rest of the paper provides an actual example of the method’s use. It is based on Labzina
and Schofield (2015). This section applies the MNL with VCS to the evaluation of the British
General elections.
5.1 Model
The UK has five major parties: Labour (1), Conservatives (2), Liberal Democrats (3), Scottish
National Party (SNP) (4), and Plaid Cymru (PC) (5). Labour, Conservatives in LibDems
run in all three British electoral regions: England (1), Scotland (2), and Wales (3). SNP runs
only in Scotland. PC runs only in Wales:
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Φ
′
=

1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
 (5.1)
The spatial model:
u(xi, zj) = λj − β||xi − zj||+ µjr(i) + i (5.2)
Meanwhile, because of the structure of (5.1), several assumptions are made to simplify the
model. Only µ12, µ13, µ22, and µ23 are estimated; for all other combinations of j and r:
µjr = 0.
The main aim of this analysis is to evaluate the mixed party valences. Because of the model’s
specification, the mixed party valences are defined as:
λ′j = λj +
1
n
∑
r(i):µjr 6=0
nrµjr(i), (5.3)
where r(i) denotes the region of individual i.
Summing up:
λ′1 = λ1 +
1
n
(µ12n2 + µ13n3)
λ′2 = λ2 +
1
n
(µ22n2 + µ23n3)
λ′3 = 0
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λ′4 = λ4
λ′5 = λ5
Finally, assuming no correlation between the terms, the conservative way to estimate the
standard error:
sd(λ′j) =
√√√√V ar(λj) + 1
n2
∑
r(i):E(µjr)6=0
n2rV ar(µjr) (5.4)
Also, it is necessary to be able to predict the probabilities, so the voting predictions can
be compared to the actual results. First, since according to the logit model, the individual
voting likelihoods are predicted as pi j = e
vi j∑
k∈r(i)
evi k
, where r(i) is the region of an individual,
the voting prediction for j for the region r(i):
pˆj r =
∑
i∈r
pi j
nr
(5.5)
Then for the whole country, the predictions are:
pˆj =
1
n
∑
r∈r(i)
nr pˆj r
Assuming the zero correlation of the probabilities across the regions, the conservative estimates
of the standard errors for the probabilities on the national level:
sdpj =
√
V ar( pj ) =
√
1
n2
∑
r∈m(i)
n2rV ar( pj r)
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5.2 Data
This section provides a brief description of the data. For a more detailed overview, see
the main article with the results (Labzina and Schofield 2015). To do the estimation, the
model requires micro-level data that contains the dependent categorical scalar variable (the
party voted) and the independent vector variable (the individual position in the ideological
two-dimensional space). Also, the model utilizes the categorical variable indicating the region
of an observation (England, Wales, or Scotland).
British Electoral Study 2009-20103 provides all this necessary information. The used sample
contains 8084 observations, with 777 observations from the individuals from Scotland and
370 individuals from Wales. The individuals from Northern Ireland are excluded from the
study at the very beginning, since this region has an entirely distinct set of political parties
compared to other regions; the total of 8084 does not include them.
Regarding the dependent variable: 3,097 individuals in the sample reported to have voted for
the Conservatives, 2,350 - for the Labour party, 2,384 - for the Liberal Democrats, 210 - for
the Scottish National Party (SNP), and 43 - for Plaid Cymru (PC) – the party running only
in Wales.
The independent vector variable – the individual ideological position – is estimated using
the component factor analysis (CFA) based on a number of representative survey questions.
The aim of this procedure is to reduce the number of the ideological dimensions getting
two individual-level variables that are weakly correlated. In the case of the U.K., the two
dimensions are nationalism (the attitude towards the E.U.) and economy (left-right). 5.1
shows the estimated distribution of the ideology for sample. The list of the survey question
3 The British Election Study at The University of Essex, http://bes2009-10.org/
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Figure 5.1: CFA: Distribution of the two ideological components in the sample (from Labzina
and Schofield 2015
and a detailed description of the employed CFA procedure can be found in Schofield, Gallego,
and Jeon 2011.
5.3 Results
Based on the non-informative priors introduced in the beginning of this chapter, the Bayesian
MCMC model is specified (n = 8084). It runs 3 chains of 25,000 iterations with R package rjags.
The model has a confident convergence according to the Gelman-Rubin and Heidelberger-
Welch diagnostics (Gelman et al. 2014). Table 5.1 shows that the estimated model almost
perfectly predicts the actual vote shares in the sample.
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Table 5.1: Predicted and sample voting probabilities
England Scotland
sample est conf interval (95%) sample est conf interval (95%)
pLab 0.280 0.280 [0.277, 0.283] 0.354 0.352 [0.346, 0.359]
pCon 0.414 0.413 [0.407, 0.420] 0.167 0.167 [0.156, 0.182]
pLibDem 0.307 0.307 [0.303, 0.310] 0.216 0.216 [0.211, 0.221]
pSNP - - - 0.262 0.263 [0.258, 0.267]
pPC - - - - - -
Wales All sample
pLab 0.355 0.352 [0.339, 0.365] 0.291 0.291 [0.291, 0.291]
pCon 0.285 0.286 [0.261, 0.311] 0.383 0.383 [0.382, 0.384]
pLibDem 0.250 0.251 [0.239, 0.262] 0.295 0.295 [0.294, 0.295]
pSNP - - - 0.026 0.026 [0.026, 0.026]
pPC 0.111 0.112 [0.109, 0.114] 0.005 0.005 [0.005, 0.005]
Table 5.2 presents the estimations of the coefficients from the model. Importantly, only
µCon3’s credible interval contains 0, all other estimates have confident direction of their effect.
Table 5.3 presents the regional and mixed valences. Expectedly, valences differ across the
regions.
Counterfactual analysis
So far the model has shown an excellent performance: the estimates are significant and
correspond to the substantive considerations about the British politics. Hence, the last
question to ask: what would happen if the standard MNL were applied to the same data?
How would the valence coefficients relate to the mixed valencies from the adjusted MNL?
Table 5.4 presents the results from the counterfactual MNL. Table 5.5 contrasts the estimates
from the standard MNL and the MNL with VCS with their calculated4 confidence/credible
intervals. As expected, the MNL highly underestimates the valences of PC and SNP.
4To estimate the confidence/intervals, the standard formula for the confidence interval, x¯−1.96∗σ/√n, x¯−
1.96 ∗ σ/√n, was applied to the results from Table 5.2, 5.3, and 5,4
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Table 5.2: Estimation results
estimate credible interval (95 %)
β 0.873 [0.833, 0.913]
λLab -0.102 [-0.163,-0.039]
λCon 0.259 [0.193, 0.325]
λSNP 0.227 [0.024,0.432]
λPC -0.762 [-1.127,-0.409]
µLab2 0.589 [0.391,0.792]
µCon2 -0.466 [-0.729,-0.208]
µLab3 0.458 [0.193, 0.726]
µCon3 -0.056 [-0.363,0.247]
DIC Mean/penalized deviance 15175/15184
N 8084
Table 5.3: Regional mixed valence
England Scotland Wales Mixed
λPC - - -0.762 -0.762
λLab -0.102 0.487 0.091 0.002
λCon 0.259 -0.470 0.622 0.213
λSNP - 0.227 - 0.227
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Furthermore, the coefficients for β and λcon are wrongly estimated as well and this distinction
is statistically significant. For λlab, the MNL with VCL cannot differentiate the estimated
coefficient from zero while the usual MNL’s result is that λlab is significantly negative. Overall,
the standard MNL tends to underestimate the spatial effect captured with β and overestimate
the party effects captured with other coefficients.
Table 5.4: Counterfactual MNL
base=LibDem
Variable Est
(|t-stat|)
β 0.761***
0.017
λLab -0.024
0.029
λCon 0.281***
0.031
λSNP -3.903***
0.084
λPC -5.489**
0.160
n 8084
LL -8396.6
McFadden R2 0.141
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Table 5.5: Comparison of the results: MNL with VCS (mixed valence) (1) versus MNL (2)
with derived 95%-confidence/credible intervals
(1) (2)
β 0.873 0.761
0.833, 0.913 0.761, 0.761
λlab 0.002 -0.024
-0.060, 0.064 -0.025, -0.023
λcon 0.213 0.281
0.146, 0.279 0.280, 0.282
λsnp 0.227 -3.903
0.024, 0.432 -3.905, -3.901
λpc 0.762 -5.489
1.127, 0.409 -5.492, -5.485
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Appendix
Input parameters
• Y - the dependent categorical variable (n x 1) ∈ {1, 2, ...J}
• D = ||X−Z|| - the distance between the position of the individual and each alternative
(n x J) ∈ IR , for those pairs where j /∈ m(i) any value dij is acceptable
• M - the number of the type of the individual choice bundle (n x 1) ∈ [1,..., rank(Φ)]
• F - the description of the types of the individual choice bundles (rank(Φ) x J) ∈ {0, 1}
Typically, Y is already provided in the data, D can be explicitly calculated from the data,
and M and F require additional encoding based on the research assumptions.
Bayesian simulation of one estimation of the generalised MNL: JAGS
This subsection provides the code for the Bayesian estimation of the generalized MNL for the
JAGS-file, that is called from R via the library rjags. Without restricting the generality, the
example is given for the priors provided in 2.3 and the tentative filter matrix from 2.2.1.
GMNL_jags = func t i on ( )
{
f o r ( i in 1 :N)
{
f o r ( k in 1 :K)
{
v [ i , k ] <− lambda [ k ] + mu[m[ i ] , j ] + beta ∗ D[ i ]
[34]
expv [ i , k ] <− exp (v [ i , k ] ) ∗ phi [m[ i ] , k ]
pv [ i , k ] <− expv [ i , k ] / sum( expv [ i , 1 :K] )
}
y [ i ] ~ dcat (pv [ i , 1 :K] )
}
beta ~dnorm(0 ,1/1000)
lambda [ 1 ] <− 0
lambda [ 2 ] ~ dnorm(0 , t au l )
lambda [ 3 ] ~ dnorm(0 , t au l )
f o r ( t in 1 : 3 )
{
f o r (p in 1 : 3 ) :
{
mu[ t , p ] ~ dnorm(0 , taun )
}
}
mu[ 1 , 1 ] <− 0
tau l ~ dgamma ( . 1 , . 1 )
taun ~ dgamma ( . 1 , . 1 )
phi [ 1 , 1 ] <− 1
[35]
phi [ 1 , 2 ] <− 1
phi [ 1 , 3 ] <− 1
phi [ 2 , 1 ] <− 1
phi [ 2 , 2 ] <− 0
phi [ 2 , 3 ] <− 1
phi [ 3 , 1 ] <− 0
phi [ 3 , 2 ] <− 1
phi [ 3 , 3 ] <− 1
}
[36]
